[The above video is mostly a
reading of the text below, with an occasional aside thrown in for good measure
as they strike me as relevant. I welcome questions, comments, or concerns about the material contained in
this video.]
I noted in my review of “Twilight of the Ideals” and “The Anti-Christ” how a figure like Nietzsche seems to draw perennial criticism that denies him the charitable, broad reading that he needs to be fully understood. There are apparently those who continue to find some sort of satisfaction in identifying Nietzsche as a moral or ethical nihilist, a prototypical Nazi, or some sort of right-wing monster generally speaking. For those interested in a wonderful, articulate, and fully historicized refutation of these views, I would recommend Walter Kaufmann’s “Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.” Robert Solomon’s “Living with Nietzsche,” while lacking the biographical nature of Kaufmann’s work, also serves as an extended apology for the continued relevance and centrality of Nietzsche’s thought.
Solomon doesn’t bother with much of the territory that many people might want him to cover: his discontent with Christianity, for example. Instead, he focuses on a small number of issues which run more fully through his thought, including Nietzsche’s defense of the passions, moral perspectivism, and concept of resentment (or, as Nietzsche always says “ressentiment”). There are also incisively funny sections which defend Nietzsche’s penchant for ad hominem attacks, with Solomon suggesting that in some circumstances the ad hominem isn’t at all a logical fallacy. I won’t spell out the details of the argument here, but it’s not wholly unconvincing. Central to Solomon’s arguments throughout the book is that Nietzsche is not in fact a moral nihilist at all, but instead actually rests very closely to Aristotle’s conception of “virtue ethics,” that overused phrase now all too often thrown around in the circles of moral philosophy. In fact, it’s very difficult to imagine Nietzsche’s unabashed elitism without this.
Solomon does a great job at showing how Nietzsche’s thought works in concert with the history of philosophy. This book would be more appreciated by someone at least passingly familiar with Nietzsche’s work; the topics Solomon chooses will seem somewhat random otherwise, since they aren’t necessarily the ones that are most connected with the name of Nietzsche in the popular imagination. Of course, if you’re already familiar with his work and have given it the charitable reading that I mentioned above, the chances aren’t nearly as high that you will need Solomon’s corrective approach in fully appreciating Nietzsche in the first place. However, judging from some of the kooky things that are still shamelessly said about him, I would recommend this for those who think, as I do, that it’s best to err on the side of caution. Nietzsche, even with all of his rhetorical Sturm und Drang, and perhaps because of it, always repays judicious reading.
Solomon doesn’t bother with much of the territory that many people might want him to cover: his discontent with Christianity, for example. Instead, he focuses on a small number of issues which run more fully through his thought, including Nietzsche’s defense of the passions, moral perspectivism, and concept of resentment (or, as Nietzsche always says “ressentiment”). There are also incisively funny sections which defend Nietzsche’s penchant for ad hominem attacks, with Solomon suggesting that in some circumstances the ad hominem isn’t at all a logical fallacy. I won’t spell out the details of the argument here, but it’s not wholly unconvincing. Central to Solomon’s arguments throughout the book is that Nietzsche is not in fact a moral nihilist at all, but instead actually rests very closely to Aristotle’s conception of “virtue ethics,” that overused phrase now all too often thrown around in the circles of moral philosophy. In fact, it’s very difficult to imagine Nietzsche’s unabashed elitism without this.
Solomon does a great job at showing how Nietzsche’s thought works in concert with the history of philosophy. This book would be more appreciated by someone at least passingly familiar with Nietzsche’s work; the topics Solomon chooses will seem somewhat random otherwise, since they aren’t necessarily the ones that are most connected with the name of Nietzsche in the popular imagination. Of course, if you’re already familiar with his work and have given it the charitable reading that I mentioned above, the chances aren’t nearly as high that you will need Solomon’s corrective approach in fully appreciating Nietzsche in the first place. However, judging from some of the kooky things that are still shamelessly said about him, I would recommend this for those who think, as I do, that it’s best to err on the side of caution. Nietzsche, even with all of his rhetorical Sturm und Drang, and perhaps because of it, always repays judicious reading.
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